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ON THE COMPLEXITY OF COCKETT-SEELY POLARIZED GAMES
J. R. B. COCKETT AND C. A. PASTRO
ABSTRACT. In this paper the complexity of provability of polarized additive, multi-
plicative, and exponential formulas in the (initial) Cockett-Seely polarized game logic is
discussed. The complexity is ultimately based on the complexity of finding a strategy
in a formula which is, for polarized additive formulas, in the worst case linear in their
size. Having a proof of a sequent is equivalent to having a strategy for the internal-hom
object. In order to show that the internal-hom object can have size exponentially larger
than the formulas of the original sequent we develop techniques for calculating the size
of the multiplicative formulas.
The structure of the internal hom object can be exploited and, using dynamic program-
ming techniques, one can reduce the cost of finding a strategy in such a formula to the
order of the product of the sizes of the original formulas. The use of dynamic techniques
motivates the consideration of games as acyclic graphs and we show how to calculate
the size of these graph games for the multiplicative and additive fragment and, thus, the
cost of determining their provability using this dynamic programming approach.
The final section of the paper points out that, despite the apparent complexity of the
formulas, there is, for the initial polarized logic with all the connectives (additives,
multiplicatives, and exponentials) a way of determining provability which is linear in
the size of the formulas.
Introduction
It is a natural question in a logic to ask how hard is it to decide whether a sequent is
provable. This paper examines this question for the Cockett-Seely polarized game logic
[CS04] which we will henceforth refer to simply as polarized game logic. We shall show
that this question can be answered in linear time.
The decision procedure consists of translating the given sequent in the polarized game
logic into a single polarized game using “negation” and the “mixed par” operation. As this
is an internal-hom game, determining whether a strategy exists in this game corresponds
to determining whether a proof exists for the sequent.
To determine whether a strategy exists in a game requires, in the worst case, time
proportional to the number of edges in the tree representing that game. Thus, it becomes
important to estimate the size of this internal-hom game. While, in general, there is no
simple expression for this size, it is often possible to estimate the “uniform size” of an
internal-hom game. The uniform size is defined as the number of binary logical operations
required, in the worst case, to determine whether a strategy is present. This makes it
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2possible to get a fairly precise estimate for the size of certain internal-hom games. These
estimates allow us to demonstrate that there can be an exponential increase in the size
of the internal-hom game over the original games.
Fortunately it is possible to exploit the structure of the internal hom object and, using
dynamic programming techniques, reduce the cost of finding a strategy in such an object to
be bounded by the product of the sizes of the original game trees. This approach involves
regarding games as if they are acyclic directed graphs, a direction already pioneered by
Hyland and Schalk [HS02]. When this is done one can give precise expressions for the
size of formulas built using the multiplicatives connectives and, thus, for the cost of the
dynamic programming approach to finding a strategy.
The categorical semantics of polarized games is outside the scope of this paper. In
order to keep the paper largely self-contained we do, however, provide a description and
brief discussion of the basic concepts. The reader who is interested in a more complete
story should consult the paper of Cockett and Seely [CS04]. Such a course of action is
recommended as, in the last section of this paper, we use this semantics, albeit in a very
simple way, to show that for this model one can decide provability in linear time for the
full logic with polarized additives, multiplicatives, and exponentials.
Before starting this story we should emphasize that the multiplicative structure of
this model is not the free structure. This model has “soft” multiplicative and exponential
structures (see [CS04]). Provability in free polarized multiplicative structures has the
same complexity as provability in the corresponding multiplicative fragment of linear
logic (as any multiplicative proof net can be polarized). For multiplicative linear logic
with atoms provability is known to be NP-complete [Kan92], and even without atoms
this decision problem is just as hard: the multiplicative units can be used to simulate
the effect of having atoms [LW94]. In the presence of atoms, additives, and exponentials
(or even nonlogical axioms) these provability problems become undecidable for ordinary
linear logic [LMSS92].
The results we obtain are somewhat curious as they apply to the finite fragment of pre-
cisely the same model whose depolarization was used by Abramsky and Jagadeesan [AJ94]
to obtain full completeness for the (iso-mix) multiplicative fragment of multiplicative lin-
ear logic. This seems to highlight the important role units play in providing these logics
with their underlying complexity. Note also that using the transformation to Laurent’s
version of polarized logic [Lau02], discussed in [CS04], this model also provides, through
the coKleisli construction for the !( ) comonad, a non-trivial model of intuitionistic logic
which has a linear time provability. It is worth recalling that this is, for the free logic, a
P-space complete problem [Stat79].
The outline of this paper is as follows. In Section 1 polarized games are introduced.
In Section 2 polarized game logic is introduced. Section 3 describes the multiplicative and
exponential structure on polarized games. Section 4 shows how provability can be turned
into the question of finding a strategy in the internal-hom object. Section 5 discusses the
size of the multiplicative formulas including internal-hom objects. In Section 6, we discuss
the relationship between the dynamic programming solution to deter
3and graph games. In particular, we describe simply formulas for the size of multiplicatives
in graph games. Finally, in Section 7, we show that provability, despite the evident
complexity of the underlying additive structures, can be evaluated for this model in linear
time for the complete additive, multiplicative, and exponential logic.
1. Polarized games
A polarized game is a finite 2-player input-output game of the sort studied by Abramsky
and Jagadeesan [AJ94] and Hyland in [Hy97]. The two players are referred to as the
“opponent” and the “player”. Games are often discussed using the terminology of pro-
cesses; in these terms a game is a protocol for interaction while a map between games is a
process which interacts through these protocols on the “input” (or domain) and “output”
(or codomain) channels. On the output channel, the opponent messages come from the
“environment” and the player messages are generated by the process or “system”. On
the input channel, however, the roles are reversed: the opponent messages are generated
by the “system” and the player messages come from the “environment.”
There are two sorts of games: those in which the opponent has the first move and
those in which the player has the first move. The games introduced in this paper are the
games of the initial polarized game category [CS04]. Games are represented in a number
of ways.
An opponent game is denoted by
O = (b1 :P1, . . . , bm :Pm) =
l
i∈I
bi :Pi =
◦b1
sss
ss bmLLL
LL
P1 · · · Pm
where I = {1, . . . , m} and each Pi is, inductively, a player game. A player game is
denoted by
P = {a1 :O1, . . . , an :On} =
⊔
j∈J
aj :Oj =
•a1
sss
ss anLLL
LL
O1 · · · On
where J = {1, . . . , n} and each Oj is, inductively, an opponent game. We allow (opponent
and player) games with empty index sets; this gives two atomic games at which the
inductive construction of games begins:
1 = ( ) =
l
∅
= ◦ 0 = { } =
⊔
∅
= •
1.1. Example. A typical game (without branch labels) looks like:
◦
lll
lll
lll
ll
UUUU
UUUU
UUUU
U
•
sss
sss
s
88
88 •
sss
sss
s
KKK
KKK
K
◦

 88
88 ◦ ◦

 88
88 ◦

 88
88
• • • • • •
4Notice that this is a opponent start game.
The dual of a game G, denoted G, is defined as
O =
l
i∈I
bi :Pi =
⊔
i∈I
bi :Pi P =
l
j∈J
aj :Oj =
⊔
j∈J
aj :Oj
Thus, taking the dual of a game simply flips the black and white nodes while leaving the
structure and branch labels (the bi’s and aj’s) alone.
1.2. Morphisms of games. There are three types of morphisms: opponent morphisms
(from opponent games to opponent games), mixed (or cross) morphisms (from opponent
games to player games), and player morphisms (from player games to player games).
These are defined inductively by:
Opponent morphisms: b1 7→ h1· · ·
bm 7→ hm
 : O // (b1 :P1, . . . , bm :Pm)
where each hi : O // Pi is a mixed morphism (the process listens on the codomain
channel).
Mixed morphisms: These are either of the form
←−
bk · f : (b1 :P1, . . . , bm :Pm) // P
where k ∈ {1, . . . , m} and f : Pk // P is a player morphism (the process outputs
bk on the domain channel) or:
−→ak · g : O // {a1 :O1, . . . , an :On}
where k ∈ {1, . . . , n} and g : O // Ok is an opponent morphism (the process
outputs ak on the codomain channel).
Player morphisms: 
a1 7→ h1
· · ·
an 7→ hn
 : {a1 :O1, . . . , an :On} // P
where each hi :Oi // P is a mixed morphism (the process listens on the domain
channel).
5There are no morphisms from player to opponent.
Viewed as a process, a mixed morphisms initiates the interaction by sending a message
down either the domain channel or the codomain channel. Having sent a message down one
of these channels the process must then wait until it receives a reply from the environment
along the same channel. Having received this reply the process is, once again, in a mixed
state and can send a message down either channel. This process discipline which requires
that the reply on a channel must be received before any further action is permitted means
that processes are completely sequential. In fact, an interacting system of such processes
is “polarized” in the very strong sense that at any given time only one processes can ever
be active (i.e., between receiving and sending a message).
In Hyland’s “games for fun” [Hy97] a process is permitted to simply not respond
when it is in a mixed state, in other words partial processes are allowed. The processes
we consider here must produce a message whenever it is in a mixed state so that, for us,
processes are total. These correspond, for finite games, to winning strategies in the sense
of [AJ94].
1.3. Example. The following is a map between two opponent games:
(
a 7→ −→c · ( )
b 7→ −→e · ( )
)
:
◦
a

 b88
88
• •
//
◦
a
sss
sss
s b
KKK
KKK
K
•
c

 d88
88 •e

 f88
88
◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
Notice that this is not the only possible map between these two games, the following
are also maps:(
a 7→
−→
d · ( )
b 7→
−→
f · ( )
)
,
(
a 7→ ←−a · { }
b 7→
←−
b · { }
)
,
(
a 7→ −→c · ( )
b 7→ ←−a · { }
)
1.4. Composition. There are four types of composition we must consider: opponent op-
ponent composition, opponent mixed composition, mixed player composition, and player
player composition. These compositions can be defined via rewriting rules as follows:
Opponent opponent composition:
f ;
 b1 7→ h1· · ·
bn 7→ hn
 =⇒
 b1 7→ f ; h1· · ·
bn 7→ f ; hn

Opponent mixed composition: b1 7→ h1· · ·
bn 7→ hn
 ;←−bk · v =⇒ hk ; v and f ;−→a · v =⇒ −→a · (f ; v)
6Mixed player composition:
−→ak · v ;

a1 7→ h1
· · ·
bn 7→ hn
 =⇒ v ; hi and ←−b · v ; g =⇒ ←−b · (v ; g)
Player player composition:
a1 7→ h1
· · ·
an 7→ hn
 ; g =⇒

a1 7→ h1 ; g
· · ·
an 7→ hn ; g

1.5. Example. Here we compose an opponent map (from Example 1.3) with a mixed
map.
◦
a

 b88
88
• •
//
◦
a
sss
sss
s b
KKK
KKK
K
•
c

 d88
88 •e

 f88
88
◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
//
•
a

 b88
88
◦ ◦(
a 7→ −→c · ( )
b 7→ −→e · ( )
)
;
←−
b ·
{
e 7→ −→a · ( )
f 7→
−→
b · ( )
}
=⇒ −→e · ( ) ;
{
e 7→ −→a · ( )
f 7→
−→
b · ( )
}
=⇒ ( ) ; −→a · ( )
=⇒ −→a · (( ) ; ( ))
=⇒ −→a · ( )
Composition, as it is defined here, is exactly the cut elimination rewriting for the
polarized game logic, which we introduce in the next section. It can be shown by an
inductive argument that this is a confluent and terminating rewriting which eliminates
the composition. (See the paper of Cockett and Seely [CS01] where this is proved for a
similar system.)
1.6. Proposition.
(i) The above rewriting on morphisms terminates.
(ii) The above rewriting is confluent.
(iii) The associative law is satisfied by all composite triples.
Given a opponent game O = (b1 :P1, . . . , bm :Pm), the identity opponent morphism
1O : O // O is defined inductively as:
1O =
 b1 7→
←−
b1 · 1P1
· · ·
bm 7→
←−
bm · 1Pm

7Given a player game P = {a1 : O1, . . . , an : On}, the identity player morphism
1P : P // P is defined inductively as:
1P =

a1 7→
−→a1 · 1O1
· · ·
an 7→
−→an · 1On

Observe that in any possible composition, the identity acts as a neutral element, that
is f ; 1 = f = 1 ; f . This gives:
1.7. Proposition.
(i) Player games and player morphisms form a category.
(ii) Opponent games and opponent morphisms form a category.
(iii) Mixed morphisms between the opponent category and the player category form a
module between these categories.
The polarized categories of [CS04] are precisely modules Ĉ : Co −→ Cp and in that
paper the details of how these provide the categorical semantics for the proof theory of
polarized game logic which we now present is spelled out.
2. Polarized game logic
Proofs in polarized game logic with no atomic types or non-logical axioms correspond
precisely to morphisms between polarized games as described above. Below we display
this logic as a Gentzen style sequent calculus. It requires three kinds of sequent:
Opponent sequents: O ⊢o O
′ where O and O′ are opponent propositions.
Mixed sequents: O ⊢ P where O is an opponent proposition and P is a player propo-
sition. (This notation differs slightly from the notation in [CS04] in that we leave
the mixed sequent turnstile unannotated.)
Player sequents: P ⊢p P
′ where P and P ′ are player propositions.
The valid inferences of the polarized game logic are as follows, which are a “graded”
version of ΣΠ [CS01].✬
✫
✩
✪
A ⊢p A (atomic identities) B ⊢o B
{Xi ⊢ Y }i∈I⊔
i∈I
Xi ⊢p Y
(cotuple)
{X ⊢ Yi}i∈I
X ⊢o
d
i∈I
Yi
(tuple)
Xk ⊢p Yd
i∈I
Xi ⊢ Y
(projection)
X ⊢o Yk
X ⊢
⊔
i∈I
Yi
(injection)
8Notice that in the cotuple and tuple rules the index set I may be empty, though not in
the injection and projection rules. Also, observe that the inference system is symmetric,
that is, it has an obvious
⊔
−
d
symmetry. Explicitly, we may flip the direction of the
sequents while swapping
⊔
for
d
and “opponent” for “player” to obtain the same system.
This symmetry arises from an underlying categorical duality.
The logic has four cut rules which correspond to those permitted by the types. The first
two arise as cuts in the player and opponent sequents. The last two are the two possible
cuts on the mixed sequent. These correspond categorically to the actions expected of a
module. ✬
✫
✩
✪
X ⊢p Y Y ⊢p Z
X ⊢p Z
(p-cut)
X ⊢o Y Y ⊢o Z
X ⊢o Z
(o-cut)
X ⊢ Y Y ⊢p Z
X ⊢ Z
(mp-cut)
X ⊢o Y Y ⊢ Z
X ⊢ Z
(om-cut)
It is an easy exercise to prove:
2.1. Theorem. The polarized game logic satisfies cut elimination.
In fact, cut elimination is exactly the rewriting steps introduced in the previous section
for composition; we can make this explicit by annotating the logic with terms. Following
[CS04] we use “::” to denote the term-type membership relation, e.g., t :: U ⊢ V will mean
that t is a term of type U ⊢ V , where U (say) may be of the form a :X .✬
✫
✩
✪
1A :: A ⊢p A (atomic identities) 1B :: B ⊢o B
{hi :: Xi ⊢ Y }i∈I
{ai :hi}i∈I ::
⊔
i∈I
ai :Xi ⊢p Y
(cotuple)
{hi :: X ⊢ Yi}i∈I
(bi :hi)i∈I :: X ⊢o
d
i∈I
bi :Yi
(tuple)
g :: Xk ⊢p Y
←−ai · g ::
d
i∈I
ai :Xi ⊢ Y
(projection)
f :: X ⊢o Yk
−→
bk · f :: X ⊢
⊔
i∈I
bi :Yi
(injection)
f :: X |= Y g :: Y |= Z
f ; g :: X |= Z
(cut)
where |= represents the appropriate type
of sequent for each of the four cut rules
As this logic satisfies cut elimination, to determine provability of a sequent it suffices
to establish that there is a cut free proof of the sequent. This is precisely the same as
establishing that there is a morphism of games which is in normal form (i.e., one in which
the composition (cut) has been removed).
93. Multiplicative and exponential structure
In this section we describe the multiplicative structure on polarized games. This structure
will be used in the calculation of the complexity of provability. We shall also introduce the
exponential types (the Curien exponential) although we shall not develop their properties
in any depth.
Suppose we have games:
O = (bi :Pi | i ∈ I), O
′ = (b′i :P
′
i | i ∈ I
′), P = {aj :Oj | j ∈ J}, P
′ = {a′j :O
′
j | j ∈ J
′}
[O〉P ] This operation takes an opponent game O and a player game P and produces a
player game. The operation is defined inductively by:
O〉P = {aj :O  Oj | j ∈ J}
where the tensor operation  is defined below. Notice that the “direction” of the
operation points to the game whose type is inherited by O〉P .
[P 〈O] This operation is a simple left-right dual of the preceding one, taking a player
game P and an opponent game O and producing a player game. The operation is
defined inductively by:
P 〈O = {aj :Oj O | j ∈ J}
[O  O′] This operation takes in two opponent games and produces an opponent game.
It is defined inductively by:
O  O′ = (bi :Pi 〈O′, b′k :O〉P ′k | i ∈ I, k ∈ I ′)
[P 〉O] This operation takes a player game P and an opponent game O and produces
an opponent game. The operation is defined inductively by:
P 〉O = (bi :P  Pi | i ∈ I)
where the par operation  is defined below. Again, the direction of operation points
to the game whose type is inherited by the compound game.
[O 〈P ] This operation is the left-right dual, taking an opponent game O and a player
game P and producing an opponent game. The operation is defined inductively by:
O 〈P = (bi :Pi  P | i ∈ I)
[P  P ′] This operation takes in two player games and produces a player game. It is
defined inductively by:
P  P ′ = {aj :Oj 〈P ′, a′k :P 〉O′k | j ∈ J, k ∈ J ′}
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[!O] The exponential (bang) is defined inductively by:
!O =
⊗
i∈I
(bi :!
′Pi) for |I| > 0 and !( ) = ( )
where !′P = {aj :!Oi | j ∈ J}.
[?P ] The exponential (whimper) is defined inductively by:
?P =
⊕
j∈J
{aj :?
′Oj} for |J | > 0 and ?{ } = { }
where ?′O = (bi :?Pi | i ∈ I).
Notice that there are some obvious dualities:
O O = O  O O〉P = O 〈P P 〈O = P 〉O !O = ?O
There are a number of simple identities that hold of these operations; we list (without
proof) several for reference.
3.1. Lemma.
O  O′ ∼= O′  O P  P ′ ∼= P ′  P
O  1 ∼= O 0 P ∼= P
O〉0 ∼= 0 1 〈P ∼= 1
1〉P ∼= P O 〈0 ∼= O
(O  O′)〉P ∼= O〉(O′〉P ) O 〈 (P  P ) ∼= (O 〈P ) 〈P ′)
(O1 O2) O3 ∼= O1  (O2  O3) (P1  P2) P3 ∼= P1  (P2  P3)
These combinatoric operations are functors on the game categories. In the opponent
category there is a bijective correspondence
O1 O2 // O3
O2 // O1〉O3
which makes it into a monoidal closed category, see [CS04]. The exponential !( ) gives
rise to a comonad in whose Kleisli category the tensor turns into a product.
4. Provability and strategies
There is a natural question to ask when one regards games as a logic, viz, how hard is it
to decide whether a sequent is provable. Recall that there are three sorts of sequents:
O ⊢o O
′, O ⊢ P, and P ⊢p P
′.
11
We start by pointing out that it suffices to determine the complexity of deciding
whether an opponent sequent O ⊢o O
′ is provable. This is because if we are faced with a
player sequent we may negate the games and view it as an opponent sequent, i.e.,
P ⊢p P
′ = P ′ ⊢o P
Similarly any problem in the mixed setting O ⊢ P may be transformed to a problem in the
opponent setting by adding an apre`s vous move to the player game. That is, we simply
prepend the player game with an opponent node to turn it into an opponent game, e.g.,
•
a1
~~
~~
~ an
AA
AA
A
O1 · · · On
=⇒
◦
•
a1
~~
~~
~ an
AA
AA
A
O1 · · · On
Logically this is because:
O ⊢o
d
∗ P
O ⊢ P
Therefore, it suffices to determine how difficult it is to decide if there is a proof of an
opponent sequent O ⊢o O
′. There is a special case where this determination is particularly
simple, namely when the game on the left-hand side of the turnstile is ◦ = ( ). In this
case we are simply asking whether there is a morphism f : ( ) // O′ , which we shall
call a strategy in the opponent game O′.
The calculation below will determine whether or not a strategy exists in a game G.
Notice that the same procedure can be used to count the number of strategies by turning
true to 1, false to 0, meets to products, and joins to sums. The calculation is as follows:
• The empty opponent and the empty player games respectively may be evaluated
respectively as having a strategy and not having a strategy respectively, i.e.,
‖( )‖ = true ‖{ }‖ = false
• At an opponent node
d
i∈I Pi we must find a strategy in each of the Pi, and so
there is a strategy for
d
i∈I Pi if there is a strategy in the meet of the Pi’s. This is
indicated by: ∥∥∥l
i∈I
Pi
∥∥∥ =∧
i∈I
‖Pi‖
• At a player node
⊔
i∈I Oi we must find a strategy in any one of the Oi’s, and so
there is a strategy for
⊔
i∈I Oi if there is a there is a strategy in the join of the Oi’s.
This is indicated by: ∥∥∥⊔
i∈I
Oi
∥∥∥ =∨
i∈I
‖Oi‖
Therefore we obtain a decision procedure which is, in the worst case, linear in the size
of the game.
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4.1. Remark.
1. A counter-strategy corresponds to a proof of a sequent P ⊢p { } or O ⊢ { }.
Notice that the determination of whether there is a counter-strategy is exactly the
(de Morgan) dual calculation in which true and false are swapped as are ∨ and ∧.
This has the consequence that a strategy exists for a game G if and only if G has
no counter-strategy.
2. The caveat that this is a worst case scenario is important as in most cases one
does not have to visit the whole tree. Indeed, the more “bushy” the tree the more
likely this is! We may do the following very rough calculation to determine the
expected time it takes to determine whether a (bushy) tree of maximum depth d
has a strategy. We suppose the probability that an (opponent) game tree has a
strategy is p. This means the probability that the dual (player) tree has a counter-
strategy is also p. At an opponent node we are looking for the first player subtree
which does not have a strategy (i.e., has a counter-strategy) as then we can cut
off the evaluation of the conjunct and return false. Dually at a player node we are
looking for the first opponent subtree which has a strategy as then we can cut off
the evaluation of the disjunct and return true.
If we are sitting at an opponent node with a very large branching factor the expected
number of edges we will have to inspect is then the sum of the probabilities that
the edge will have to be inspected. This is therefore bounded by:
∞∑
i=0
pi =
1
1− p
Now this happens at each level of the tree so that the expected cost of evaluating a
tree is ( 1
1−p
)d, where d is the depth of the tree.
Thus, rather surprisingly, the fact that a tree is bushy does not affect the expected
evaluation time as adversely as might have been thought. A reasonable guess at the
probability p is, of course, 1
2
so that to evaluate a tree of depth d might be expected
to take time 2d no matter how bushy it is!
We now need to be more precise about our calculations and, in particular, what we
mean by “size” of a game tree G. We will use a variety of measures. The first and simplest
is the number of edges in the game tree, which we write esize[G]. Note that the edges may
be counted first by those which leave opponent nodes, esizeo[G], and then those which
leave player nodes, esizep[G]. Very closely related to this measure (for trees) is the number
of nodes |G|, which we shall mean when we speak of the size of G. Once again the nodes
can be divided into the number of opponent nodes, |G|o, and the number of player nodes,
|G|p. It is not hard to see that esize[G] = |G| − 1 for any game tree.
Another way of measuring the size of a game tree is the uniform size which is defined
as:
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• usize [( )] = usize [{ }] = 0
• usize
[d
i∈I ai :Gi
]
= usize
[⊔
i∈I ai :Gi
]
= n− 1 +
∑
i∈I usize[Gi]
The form of this definition immediately tells us that usize[G] ≤ esize[G]. The uniform
size of a game tree is important as it measures the number of binary logical operations
required to evaluate the tree. To see this note that to evaluate an m-ary conjunction
requires m− 1 binary operations.
Yet another way to measure the size of a game tree is by counting its leaves, which
is written leaves[G]. Another reason why the uniform size is a simple measure is that it
is exactly the number of leaves less one. We may summarize the relationship between all
these size measurements as follows:
usize[G] = leaves[G]− 1 ≤ esize[G] = |G| − 1 = esizeo[G] + esizep[G] = |G|o + |G|p − 1
The difference between usize[G] and esize[G] may be viewed as the cost associated
with retrieving the arguments of the binary operations. Notice that the uniform cost of
any tree with branching factor one is therefore zero as the complete cost of evaluation
is in the retrieval! In fact, it is precisely nodes with branching factor one which cannot
be accounted for (upto a constant factor) by the uniform size. In fact, if one knows the
depth of the game tree is say d, then each path to a leaf contains at most d edges and so
one can bound the edge size by:
usize[G] ≤ esize[g] ≤ d · (1 + usize[G])
This means that the uniform size of a game tree is generally going to give a fairly tight
lower bound on the worst case cost of evaluating a game tree for the presence of a strategy.
The general case of determining the provability of a sequent can also be organized into
the question of whether a strategy exists in a formula, although we have to construct a
new game tree to represent this problem. Given an opponent sequent O ⊢o O
′, we show
how to create a game G (which is in fact O〉O′) so there is a proof of O ⊢o O′ if and
only if there is a strategy in G.
The translation between a proof of O ⊢o O
′ and a strategy in G is as follows. Consider
a proof for:
• O ⊢o
d
i∈I bi : Pi. It must start as (bi : ui)i∈I where ui is a proof of O ⊢ Pi. If
I = {1, . . . , m} this may be represented as a strategy in the following tree:
◦b1
qqq
qqq bmMMM
MMM
✁
✁
❆
❆
u′
1
· · ·
✁
✁
❆
❆
u′m
where u′i is the tree whose strategies correspond to proofs of O ⊢ Pi.
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•
d
i∈I bi : Pi ⊢
⊔
j∈J aj :Oj . In this case we must make a move in either the left or
right game and then find a strategy for the remaining problem. If I = {1, . . . , m}
and J = {1, . . . , n} this may be represented as the following tree of choices:
•
b1
jjjj
jjjj
jjjj
jjjj
jjj
bm



a1 <<
<<
<<
<<
an
TTTT
TTTT
TTTT
TTTT
TTT
✁
✁
❆
❆
u′
1
· · ·
✁
✁
❆
❆
u′m ✁
✁
❆
❆
v′
1
· · ·
✁
✁
❆
❆
v′n
where u′i is the tree whose strategies correspond to proofs of Pi ⊢
⊔
j∈J aj :Oj and
v′j is the tree whose strategies correspond to proofs of
d
i∈I bi :Pi ⊢ Oj.
•
⊔
j∈J aj :Oj ⊢p P . It must start as {aj :vj}j∈J where vj is a strategy for Oj ⊢ P . If
J = {1, . . . , n} this may be represented as the following tree:
◦a1
nnn
nnn
n an
PPP
PPP
P
✁
✁
❆
❆
v′
1
· · ·
✁
✁
❆
❆
v′n
where v′j is the tree whose strategies correspond to proofs of Oj ⊢ P .
This means the proof of any opponent sequent O ⊢o O
′ can be transformed into
a strategy in O〉O′ using this translation process. From a categorical (and logical)
perspective this is just using the fact that:
O ⊢o O
′
( ) ⊢o O〉O′
It would therefore seem that the complexity of provability may depend on the size of this
formula. This makes it interesting to know how the size of this formula grows compared
to the size of the original expressions.
5. On the size of multiplicatives
To answer the question of how formulas grow when they are combined using the multi-
plicative (and exponential) operators it is useful to develop some techniques for calculating
with game trees.
5.1. Using multiplicities. To calculate with trees a useful technique is to use mul-
tiplicities. Intuitively if a subgame occurs multiple times, rather than write the game
multiple times, one can simply multiply it by the number of times it occurs. For example,
O =
◦
ttt
tt JJJ
JJ
•

 88
8 •

 88
8
◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
= (2:{2:( )}) P =
•

 88
8
◦ ◦

 88
8
• •
= {1:( ), 1:(2 :{ })}
15
We may then calculate
O〉P = {1:O  ( ), 1:O  (2 :{ })}
= {1:O, 1:(2 :{2:( )}) (2 :{ })}
= {1:O, 1:(2 :{2:( )} 〈 (2 :{ }), (2 :{2:( )})〉2:{ })}
= {1:O, 1:(2 :{2:( ) (2 :{ })}, 2:{ })}
= {1:O, 1:(2 :{2:(2 :{ })}, 2:{ })}
= {1:(2 :{2:( )}), 1:(2 :{2:(2 :{ })}, 2:{ })}
which, graphically, is the following tree:
O〉P =
•
iiii
iiii
iiii
iiii
i
TTTT
TTTT
TTTT
TTT
◦








44
44
4 ◦
ggggg
gggg
ggggg
ggggg
g
ttt
tt
ttt
t
99
99
99
MMM
MMM
MMM
M
•



**
**
* •



**
**
* •








44
44
4 •








44
44
4 • •
◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦



**
**
* ◦



**
**
* ◦



**
**
* ◦



**
**
*
• • • • • • • •
While this does facilitate the calculation of multiplicatives, it is still too detailed to
allow an easy estimation of the size of a tensor or par of two game trees. However, before
abandoning this let us make an observation on the exponentials. Consider the following
game:
!(n : {m : ( )})
It is can be seen that this is the formula:
(n : {m : (n− 1 : {m : (n− 2 : · · · (1 : {m : ( )}) · · · )})})
The leaf size (which is one more than the uniform size) of this formula is
leaves[!(n : {m : ( )})] = n! ·mn
This provides a lower bound on the possible growth in the size of a game tree as this
is a lower bound on the edge size of a particular tree.
It is reasonable to wonder what an upper bound on the edge size might be. An
alternative way of viewing the exponential bang (!) is as the game tree of opponent
initiated backtrackings. This means that on the opponents move one can switch to any
opponent move which had been a possibility on the play but had not been chosen. This
means a path is a sequence of choices of opponent moves interleaved with a possible
player move which may be played after the opponent move. For esizep[G] > 0 there are a
maximum of
esizeo[G]! · esizep[G]
esizeo[G]
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leaves, and hence paths. As each such path can contain at most 2 · esizeo[G] edges the
upper bound on the edge size is
2 · esizeo[G] · esizeo[G]! · esizep[G]
esizeo[G]
When esizep[G] = 0 there are a maximum of esizeo[G] leaves which is exactly the same as
the number of edges in G. For games of depth two or greater (i.e., esizep[G] > 0) however
this shows that the exponentials may produce very large game trees!
5.2. Using profiles. If G is an arbitrary game tree its profile is a list of the number
of nodes which occur at each level. Notice the list always begins with a 1. The two trees
above and their tensor have the following profiles:
prof[O] = [1, 2, 4], prof[P ] = [1, 2, 2], and prof[O〉P ] = [1, 2, 6, 8, 8]
The notation prof[G]i will be used to indicate the number of nodes of G at the i-th depth
(starting at zero). We have the following useful observation:
5.3. Proposition. For O and O′ opponent games and P a player game
(i) prof[O  O′]0 = prof[O〉P ]0 = 1
(ii) prof[O  O′]n =
n∑
i=0
(
⌊n/2⌋
⌊i/2⌋
)
· γin−i · prof[O]i · prof[O
′]n−i
(iii) prof[O〉P ]n+1 =
n∑
i=0
(
⌊n/2⌋
⌊i/2⌋
)
· γin−i · prof[O]i · prof[P ]n−i+1
where
γmn =
{
1 if n or m is zero or even
0 otherwise
The rationale for this formula is as follows. To get a node at depth n in O  O′ we
must interleave the path to a node of O at depth i with the path to a node of O′ at
depth n − i. As we can interleave only at the even nodes there are
(
⌊n/2⌋
⌊i/2⌋
)
possible such
interleavings all of which provide distinct nodes. Finally, we can only produce interleaved
paths of the required length if at least one of i or n − i is even as we have to end in one
of the paths having left the other at an even index. This results in the factor γni which is
applied to each term.
Proof. It is easy to see that the formulas work for the base cases ( ) and { }. Let
O = (ai : Pi | 0 ≤ i < n) and O
′ = (bj : P
′
j | 0 ≤ j < m) then
O O′ = (ai : Pi 〈O′, bj : O〉P ′j | 0 ≤ i < n, 0 ≤ j < m)
For depths of zero and one its profile is respectively
prof[O O′]0 = 1 and prof[O O′]1 = n+m
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Checking that the formula is correct for these depths is straightforward. Now consider
the inductive step for the last case:
prof[O  O′]r+2 =
n∑
i=1
prof[Pi 〈O′]r +
m∑
j=1
prof[O〉P ′j ]r
=
n∑
k=1
r∑
i=0
(⌊ r
2
⌋
⌊ i
2
⌋
)
· γr−ii · prof[O
′]i · prof[Pk]r−i+1
+
m∑
j=1
r∑
i=0
(⌊ r
2
⌋
⌊ i
2
⌋
)
· γr−ii · prof[O]i · prof[Pj ]r−i+1
=
r∑
i=0
(⌊ r
2
⌋
⌊ i
2
⌋
)
· γr−ii · prof[O
′]i ·
(
n∑
k=1
prof[Pk]r−i+1
)
+
r∑
i=0
(⌊ r
2
⌋
⌊ i
2
⌋
)
· γr−ii · prof[O]i ·
(
m∑
j=1
prof[P ′j ]r−i+1
)
=
r∑
i=0
(⌊ r
2
⌋
⌊ i
2
⌋
)
· γr−ii · prof[O
′]i · prof[O]r−i+2
+
r∑
i=0
( ⌊ r
2
⌋
⌊ r
2
⌋−⌊ i
2
⌋
)
· γr−ii · prof[O]i · prof[O
′]r−i+2
as ⌊ r
2
⌋ − ⌊ i
2
⌋ = ⌊ r−i
2
⌋ we may reindex the second sum:
=
r∑
i=0
(⌊ r
2
⌋
⌊ i
2
⌋
)
· γr−i+2i · prof[O
′]i · prof[O]r−i+2
+
r+2∑
i′=2
( ⌊ r
2
⌋
⌊ i
′
2
⌋−1
)
· γr−i
′+2
i′ · prof[O
′]i′ · prof[O]r−i′+2
=
r∑
i=2
(( ⌊ r
2
⌋
⌊ i
2
⌋−1
)
+
(⌊ r
2
⌋
⌊ i
2
⌋
))
· γr−i+2i · prof[O]i · prof[O
′]r−i+2
+
(
⌊ r
2
⌋
0
)
· (γr+20 · prof[O
′]0 · prof[O]r+2 + γ
r+1
1 · prof[O
′]1 · prof[O]r+1)
+
(⌊ r
2
⌋
⌊ r
2
⌋
)
· (γ1r+1 · prof[O
′]r+1 · prof[O]1γ
1
r+1 · prof[O
′]r+2 · prof[O]0)
=
r+2∑
i=0
(⌊ r
2
⌋+1
⌊ i
2
⌋
)
· γr−i+2i · prof[O]i · prof[O
′]r−i+2
We now wish to determine how the cost of evaluating tensors of trees can grow. A first
guess might be that the tensor always causes an exponential increase in size. However,
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this is not the case in general: the growth depends on the shape of the tree. Below we
consider two examples where an exact computation of the uniform size (hence our interest
in this measure) is possible:
1. First we consider a case where the growth is polynomial:
A0 = { }, An+1 = {2:Bn} and B0 = ( ), Bn+1 = (1:An)
so that, for example,
A3 = {2:(1 :{2:( )})} =
•
rrr
rr LLL
LL
◦ ◦
•

 33
3 •

 33
3
◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
Notice that usize[A2n] = usize[A2n−1] and so usize[A2n] = 2
n − 1. Now consider
usize[A2n  A2m]. The tree A2n  A2m has a uniform maximum depth of 2(n +m)
whose leaf count is concentrated in the term(
n+m
n
)
· γnm · prof[A2n]2n · prof[A2n]2m =
(
n+m
n
)
· 2n · 2m
≤ 2n+m · 2n · 2m
= (2n)2 · (2m)2
Thus, the uniform size is bounded by a (degree 4) polynomial in the uniform sizes
of the two games in this case.
2. To demonstrate that an exponential growth is possible we consider a very simple
example:
L0 = { }, Ln+1 = {1:L
′
n} and L
′
0 = ( ), L
′
n+1 = (1:Ln)
This gives |L2n| = |L2n|p + |L2n|o = (n+ 1) + n although usize[L2n] = 0. However
usize[L2n  L2m] = prof[L2n  L2m]2n+2m
=
(
n+m
n
)
· prof[L2n]2n · prof[L2m]2m
=
(
n+m
n
)
≥
nm +mn
2
This gives a lower bound on the uniform size of the tensored trees which has an
exponential increase on the number of nodes in the trees.
This gives an indication that the complexity of a naive evaluation can be quite bad.
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6. Dynamic programming and graph games
We have already established that to determine whether a sequent ( ) ⊢o U , where U is an
arbitrary additive formula, has a proof may be determined in time bounded by (and in
the worst case) esize[U ]. Fortunately, for the provability of O ⊢o O
′, where O and O′ are
opponent games, there is something further we can do as the structure of O ⊢o O
′ can be
exploited.
6.1. Dynamic programming. Notice in the calculation of O〉O′ that subexpressions
may occur multiple times. This indicates that it may be valuable to attempt a dynamic
programming approach where one calculates the values of the sub-problems at most once.
This is, in fact, the case and in this section we show:
6.2. Proposition. Using dynamic programming one can evaluate the provability of a
sequent O ⊢o O
′ using
usize[O]|O′|p + usize[O
′]|O|p + |O|p|O
′|p
binary operations.
Notice that this is a substantial improvement on a simple evaluation of the game
tree resulting from the internal-hom object. The calculation below essentially counts the
number of binary operations required but is generous enough to allow for single argument
evaluations. An initial observation is:
6.3. Lemma. For any player game P = {ai : (bj :Pij | j ∈ {1, . . . , ni}) | i ∈ {1, . . . , n}}:
(i)
n∑
i=1
ni∑
j=1
|Pij|p = |P |p − 1
(ii) usize[P ] = n− 1 +
n∑
i=1
(ni − 1) +
n∑
i=1
ni∑
j=1
usize [Pij ]
Proof of Proposition 6.2. To determine the evaluation of P 〉O, where O = (ai :
Pi | i ∈ {1, . . . , n}), we distribute P inside the opponent game to obtain (ai : P  Pi |
i ∈ {1, . . . , n}). This can be solved in n− 1+
∑n
i=1 cost[P Pi] logical operations, where
cost[G] denotes the cost to evaluate ‖G‖. In what follows we show
cost[P  Pi] = usize[P ]|Pi|p + usize[Pi]|P |p + |P |p|Pi|p
so that
cost[P 〉O] = cost[P 〉 (ai : Pi | i ∈ {1, . . . , n})]
= n− 1 + usize[P ] ·
n∑
i=1
|Pi|i + |P |p ·
n∑
i=1
usize[Pi]i + |P |p ·
n∑
i=1
|Pi|i
= n− 1 + usize[P ]|O|p + |P |p(usize[O]− (n− 1)) + |P |p|O|p
≤ usize[P ]|O|+ usize[O]|P |p + |P |p|O|p
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For player games P and P ′ we now calculate cost[P  P ′]. First fix some notation:
P = {ai :Oi | i ∈ {1, . . . , m}} P
′ = {bj :O
′
j | j ∈ {1, . . . , n}}
Oi = (aij :Pij | j ∈ {1, . . . , mi}) O
′
j = (bji :Pji | i ∈ {1, . . . , nj})
The calculation will proceed as follows:
‖P  P ′‖ =
( m∨
i=1
‖Oi 〈P ′‖
)
∨
( n∨
j=1
‖P 〉O′j‖
)
=
( m∨
i=1
( mi∧
k=1
‖Pik  P ′‖
))
∨
( n∨
j=1
( n′j∧
l=1
‖P  P ′jl‖
))
This shows how this value can be calculated using dynamic programming techniques
since the computation of ‖Pik  P ′jl‖ will reoccur.
We will now calculate inductively the number of logical operations involved in calcu-
lating this value. Note that the base cases are when the index sets are empty; these are
handled by the general argument. The following “tree of required operations” may be
helpful to visualize the calculation.
∨
mmm
mmm
mmm
mmm
OOO
OOO
OOO
OO∨
m
vv
vv
vv
II
II
II
···
∨
n
yy
yy
yy
FF
FF
FF
···∧
m1
xx
xx
xx ··· HH
HH
HH
∧
mm
···
∧
n1
···
∧
nn
yy
yy
yy ··· GG
GG
GG
‖P11  P ′‖ ‖P1m1  P ′‖ ‖P  P ′n1‖ ‖P  P ′nnn‖
It takes m−1 logical operations to form the join or meet of m terms. The calculations
for the left side of the tree
(m− 1) +
m∑
i=1
(mi − 1) +
m∑
i=1
mi∑
k=1
cost[Pik  P ′]
plus the calculations for the right side of the tree
(n− 1) +
n∑
j=1
(nj − 1) +
n∑
j=1
nj∑
l=1
cost[P  P ′jl]
plus the one join at the root, therefore, gives us the total number of logical operations.
Notice that if either or both sides of this calculation reduce to a single argument calculation
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we still have the cost of the single binary operation into which the retrieval costs can be
bundled.
In the calculations of the ‖Pik  P ′‖’s and the ‖P  P ′jl‖’s it can be seen that we will
end up calculating the ‖Pik  P ′jl‖’s twice. Thus, from the overall sum we can subtract
the number of calculations required to calculate this value once, which is
m∑
i=1
mi∑
k=1
n∑
j=1
nj∑
l=1
cost[Pik  P ′jl]
What we then have is:
cost[P  P ′] = 1 + (m− 1) +∑
i
(mi − 1) +
∑
ik
cost[Pik  P ′]
+ (n− 1) +
∑
j
(nj − 1) +
∑
jl
cost[P  P ′jl]
−
∑
ik
∑
jl
cost[Pik  P ′jl]
Applying the theorem inductively to the three embedded terms yields
≤ 1 + (m− 1) +
∑
i
(mi − 1) +
∑
ik
(usize[Pik]|P
′|p + usize[P
′]|Pik|p + |Pik|p|P
′|p)
+ (n− 1) +
∑
j
(nj − 1) +
∑
jl
(usize[P ]|P ′jl|p + usize[P
′
jl]|P |p + |P |p|P
′
jl|p)
−
∑
ik
∑
jl
(usize[Pik]|P
′
jl|p + usize[P
′
jl]|Pik|p + |Pik|p|P
′
ij|p)
Applying Lemma 6.3 (i) and rearranging terms:
= 1 + (m− 1) +
∑
i
(mi − 1)
+
(∑
ik
usize[Pik]|P
′|p − usize[Pik](|P
′|p − 1)
)
+ usize[P ](|P ′|p − 1))
+ (n− 1) +
∑
i
(ni − 1)
+
(∑
jl
usize[P ′jl]|P |p − usize[P
′
jl](|P |p − 1)
)
+ usize[P ′](|P |p − 1)
+ |P |p|P
′|p
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With some more rearranging:
= (m− 1) +
∑
i
(mi − 1) +
∑
ik
usize[Pik] + usize[P ](|P
′|p − 1)
+ (n− 1) +
∑
i
(ni − 1) +
∑
jl
usize[P ′jl] + usize[P
′](|P |p − 1)
+ |P |p|P
′|p
And finally, by Lemma 6.3 (ii):
≤ usize[P ]|P ′|p + usize[P
′]|P |p + |P |p|P
′|p
Usually to calculate the complexity of a dynamic programming algorithm one counts
the number of subproblems and multiplies that number by the cost of computing that
problem. As the cost of computation at each node varies according to the structure of
the games we have done a more detailed analysis which removes the cost of the common
computation. We now return to apply these counting techniques with confidence!
6.4. Graph games. This dynamic programming approach encourages us to view the
games, not as trees, but as acyclic directed graphs. This is, of course, not a new idea and
has been explored by Hyland and Schalk [HS02]. The point is that one of these “graph
games” will have a strategy if and only if the corresponding “tree game” has such. To
evaluate whether a graph game has a strategy requires time proportional to the number
of edges in the graph.
One of the attractions of graph games is that one can count the number of edges and
nodes of any game which is expressed using the multiplicatives (exponentials seem harder
to analyze as they use the history of how one reaches a node). This means that one can
calculate the cost of evaluating (on this initial model) an arbitrary polarized multiplicative
and additive formula using dynamic programming techniques surprisingly easily.
We should perhaps remind the reader at this stage that the multiplicative structure
of these models is emphatically not free. Provability in the free such structure with
multiplicative units is NP-complete as this is the case in the unpolarized setting (due
to Kanovich’s results [Kan92]). Recall also that with exponentials and additives in the
unpolarized setting these problems become undecidable. It is likely, although we have not
done the calculation, that this is also true for the free polarized multiplicative-additive
logics with exponentials.
In contrast to the above results the problem in the initial polarized game logic is,
for all these fragments, quite decidable as a given formula can be “unwrapped” into its
purely additive structure. The problem is that unwrapping into purely additive structure
can result in a huge increase in the size of the formula. Given the analysis above it is
reasonable to suppose one can do much better then naively expanding into a game tree
and evaluating.
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We shall now expect our formula to belong to the polarized additive, multiplicative
fragment. In other words to be in the following form:
Opponent Player
(bi : Pi | i ∈ I) O  O′ {aj : Oj | j ∈ J} P  P ′
O 〈P P 〉O P 〈O O〉P
It is easy to see that the cost of evaluation in a graph game is dominated by the
number of edges in the game. Thus, for example, in the graph game produced for the
dynamic calculation of P P ′ there are |P |p|P ′|p player states. From each of these states
one can either make a move in the first or second coordinate resulting in
esizep[P  P ] = esizep[P ]|P ′|p + esizep[P ′]|P |p
We use the fact that the number of edges leaving a node (up to a factor) always dominates
the cost of the calculation needed at that node. Similarly there are |P |o|P
′|p + |P |p|P
′|o
opponent states. While the number of opponent edges is given by:
esizeo[P  P ] = esizeo[P ]|P ′|p + esizeo[P ′]|P1|p
We therefore have:
6.5. Lemma. The cost of evaluating multiplicative expressions using dynamic program-
ming (up to a constant factor) is bounded by:
• cost[(bi : Pj | j ∈ {1, .., m})] = m+
∑m
j=1 cost[Pj]
• cost[{ai : Oi | i ∈ {1, .., n})] = n +
∑n
i=1 cost[Oi]
• cost[O  O] = esize[O]|O′|o + esize[O′]|O|o
• cost[O〉P ] = esize[O]|P |o + esize[P ]|O|o
• cost[P  P ′] = esize[P ]|P ′|p + esize[P ′]|P |p
• cost[P 〉O] = esize[P ]|O|p + esize[O]|P |p
Note that in this calculation there is no need to assume that we are starting with trees.
We may start with acyclic directed graphs and recursively apply the calculation. Indeed,
to evaluate an arbitrary expression this is what we must do: a multiplicative expression
allows us to build an acyclic graph with a certain number of player and opponent nodes
and arrows. As we apply constructors we build new graphs, all we need to keep track of is
the numbers of opponent nodes, player nodes and edges. Below is the explicit calculation
for doing so. Let
size[G] = (|G|o, |G|p, esizep[G])
and size[G1] = (n1, N1, E1) and size[G2] = (n2, N2, E2). Then:
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• size[(b1 : G1, . . . , bn : Gn)] =
∑n
i=1 size[Gi] + (0, 1, n)
• size[{a1 : G1, . . . , am : Gm}] =
∑m
j=1 size[Gj] + (1, 0, m)
• size[G1  / 〈 /〉G2] = (n1 · n2, n1 ·N2 +N1 · n2, E1 · n2 + n1 · E2)
• size[G1  / 〈 /〉G2] = (N1 · n2 + n1 ·N2, N1 ·N2, E1 ·N2 +N1 ·E2)
The cost of determining whether a formula is provable is bounded by the last entry
in this cost calculation. It is worth noting that, even though the dynamic approach to
this evaluation has helped, we are still left with an exponential bound for the evaluation
of the provability of a multiplicative expression as the complexity for multiplicatives is
essentially multiplicative!
We may also very easily calculate the profile of the graph games which results from
multiplicative expressions. The only change needed over our previous calculation is to
remove the binomial coefficients. For profiles the only distinction between player and
opponent is the starting point of the profile. It is necessary, therefore, only to state the
calculation for tensor and sums:
• prof[{a1 : G1, ..., an : Gn}]0 = 1
• prof[{a1 : G1, ..., an : Gn}]m+1 =
∑n
i=1 prof[Gi]m
• prof[G1 G2]n =∑ni=0 γin−i · prof[G1]i · prof[G2]n−i
• prof[G1〉P ]0 = 1
• prof[G1〉P ]n+1 =∑ni=0 γin−i · prof[G1]i · prof[P ]n−i+1
This allows an easy calculation of the number of states used by the dynamic algorithm.
However, notice that the profile does lose the edge information. One can actually bound
the number of edges by:
esize(G) ≤
n−1∑
i=0
prof[G]i · prof[G]i+1
as each edge must end in a level one greater than where it starts. Of course this bound is
going to be, in general, very poor; its only advantage is that it can be derived from the
profile of the acyclic graph which is easily calculated.
7. The complexity of provability
The technique of viewing a game tree as an acyclic graph has certainly led to improvements
in the determination of provability. We hope also it has led to the reader having a better
feel for the combinatoric structure of these games.
However, the story of the complexity of provability is not over! We have yet to really
use the categorical structure the initial model of polarized games which is what we now
exploit. We open with the following observation:
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7.1. Proposition. In the initial model of polarized games:
(i) A game G has a strategy if and only if there is (a possibly mixed) map ( ) −→ G.
(ii) A game G has a counter-strategy if and only if there is a (a possibly mixed) map G
−→ {}.
(iii) Every game either has a strategy or a counter-strategy but not both.
(iv) OO′ has a strategy if and only if O and O′ have strategies. Similarly, O〉P has
a strategy if and only if O and P have strategies.
(v) P P ′ has a counter-strategy if and only if P and P ′ have counter-strategies. Sim-
ilarly, P 〉O has a counter-strategy if and only if O and P have counter-strategies.
(vi) G has a strategy (resp. counter-strategy) if and only if G has a counter-strategy
(resp. strategy).
(vii) !O has a strategy if and only if O has a strategy.
(viii) ?P has a counter-strategy if and only if P has a counter strategy.
Proof.
(i) This follows immediately from the discussion in Section 4.
(ii) Dual to (i).
(iii) If a game G has a strategy and a counter-strategy then there would be a mix map ( )
−→ {} which there is not! In Remark 4.1 we noted that the calculation to determine
the possession of a strategy is exactly the de Morgan dual calculation to that for
having a counter-strategy. Thus, if one is true the other is necessarily false.
(iv) If ( )
s
−→ O  O′ then, as ( ) is a final object, we obtain
( )
s
−→ O O′ 1  !−−−→ O  ( ) = O
and so O and (similarly) O′ have strategies. Conversely if ( )
s1−−→ O and ( )
s2−−→ O′
then
( ) = ( ) ( ) s1  s2−−−−−→ O  O′
provides a strategy for O1 O2. A similar argument works for the mixed tensor: if
( )
s1−−→ O and ( )
s2−−→ P then
( ) = ( ) ( ) s1  s2−−−−−→ O  P
Conversely, if ( )
s
−→ O〉P then we may compose with O〉P !〉1P−−−−→ ( )〉P = P
to obtain a strategy in P . As P has a strategy P 6= { } and so P = {ai : Oi | i ∈ I}
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where I 6= ∅. This means that in O〉P = {ai : O  Oi | i ∈ I} the strategy s
must choose a branch and so there is a strategy in O  Oi for some i ∈ I. By the
argument above this happens if and only if there is a strategy in both O and Oi.
Thus, there is certainly a strategy in O.
(v) Dual to (iv).
(vi) If ( )
s
−→ O then we obtain a strategy
( ) =!( )
!s
−−→!O
Conversely, if ( )
s′
−−→!O is a strategy we can use dereliction to obtain a strategy
( )
s′
−−→!O
ǫ
−→ O
(vii) Dual to (v).
This means that we may completely redo the our calculation of the cost of provability!
To determine whether O ⊢o O
′ is provable we must determine whether there is a strategy
in O〉O′. But this is the case only if there is no counter-strategy for O〉O′. There is a
counter-strategy for O〉O′ only if there is a counter-strategy for O and O′, that is there
is no strategy for O and there is a counter-strategy for O′. In other words, O ⊢o O
′ is
provable if and only if either there is no strategy for O or a strategy for O′.
Clearly we may now show that the cost of provability is linear for an arbitrary sequent
in the polarized additive, multiplicative, and exponential fragment by successively using
the reductions provided by the proposition. Therefore we have:
7.2. Corollary. In initial polarized game logic the complexity of provability is linear
in the size of the sequents.
Proof. We shall explicitly provide a procedure based on the proposition for determining
the provability of a formula. Let ‖P‖p be the value of provability of P ⊢p { } and ‖O‖o
the value of provability of ( ) ⊢o O. Then:
‖P  P ′‖p = ‖P‖p ∨ ‖P ′‖p
‖O〉P‖p = ‖P 〈O‖p = ‖O‖o ∧ ‖P‖p
‖O‖p = ¬‖O‖o
‖{ai : Oi | i ∈ I}‖p =
∨
i∈I
‖Oi‖o
‖O  O′‖o = ‖O‖o ∧ ‖O′‖o
‖O 〈P‖o = ‖P 〉O‖o = ‖O‖o ∨ ‖P‖p
‖P‖o = ¬‖P‖p
‖(bj : Pj | j ∈ J}‖o =
∧
j∈J
‖Pj‖p
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There are dual rules for determining whether there is a counter-strategy. Clearly this
procedure is linear in the size of the term.
Rather surprisingly provability has therefore reduced to the cost of looking at the
formulas. As, in the worst case, this is the very least one must do this is a hard bound.
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